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Abstract
For economies in transition, the issues of property rights protection provided by
the state and implications for economic performance are very important. The paper
develops an endogenous growth model with incomplete capital markets and the level of
public protection of property rights determined by voting (possibly di®erent from the
majority voting). An exogenous in-°ow to the economy that constitutes a rent-seeking
pie reduces incentives to invest in production and negatively a®ects the growth rate.
An empirical investigation veri¯es the implications of the model using cross-section
data on Russian regions. During transition (since 1992), Russian regions demonstrated
enormousdi®erences in growth rates. It isfound that thesedi®erences may be explained
by initial conditions and e®ectiveness of institutions. Also, positive impact of inequality
on the level of public protection of property rights isfound and a theoretical explanation
for this phenomenon in the framework of the model is provided.
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Recently, it has become very clear that liberalization, stabilization, and privati-
zation in an economy in transition are not su±cient conditions for an upturn in
economic activity. The Russian economy, as well as Ukrainian and some other
transition economies, continues to stagnate. Among various explanations of the
continued failure of these economies to grow, the inability of the state to promote
development of 'good' economic institutions and the unexpected stability of 'bad'
ones appears to be of particular interest.
Generally, the process of public enforcement and regulation of property rights
by the state are in°uenced by social demands. Agents reveal their preferences
over government policy through usual political mechanisms. It is quite natural to
expect that it is the rich agents who favor the full protection of property rights.
However, there is substantial evidence that in Russia, as well as in some other
transition economies, the rich agents are the main bene¯ciaries of poor protection
of property rights, which allows them to gain from non-productive activities such
as rent-seeking through maintenance of appropriation capacities. (In this paper,
rent-seeking is de¯ned to be any costly redistributive activity.) In the absence
of adequate public protection of property rights by the state, these rent-oriented
structures took control of a substantial share of the national economy. More
precisely, these structures (the largest of them are so called oligarchies) combine
productive activity with an extensive struggle for the rent-seeking pie. Such rents
have arose from various arbitrage opprotunities, provided, e.g., by foreign trade
liberalization with incomplete price liberalization, or privatization in the absence
of credit markets, whichallowedmanagers touse state-subsidized credits on short-
term money market (see Hellman, 1998). Their success at rent-seeking makes
it non-surprising that the oligarchs prefer relatively poor protection of property
rights. This in turn forces the other economic agents to invest in protection from
appropriation. This may be the main reason why the Russian state has failed to
2establish and enforce aclearly de¯nedsystem ofproperty rights as yet (see Leitzel,
1997). Recently, Frye and Shleifer (1997) conducted a survey of shopkeepers in
Moscow and Warsaw and compared the e®ectiveness of the Russian and Polish
legal systems in dispute resolution and the role of protection rackets. Their study
showed that in Russia, the demand for private protection of property rights is
extremely high, and also that enterprises have to operate in much more corrupt
environment.
Private protection of property rights is de¯ned to be the protection provided
against other would-be protectors, contracting partners who fail or avoid to ful-
¯ll terms of the contract (e.g., repay the debt), usual criminals, etc. It is by no
means assumed that an agent investing in private protection invests necessarily
in military capacities or such like. Rather, it may be investment in relational
capital, e.g. in establishing corrupt relations with state authorities, and even
hiring a lawyer. In economic terms, it is a strategy of an economic agent to
increase e±ciency and predictability in its business relations. Hendley, Murrell,
and Ryterman (1998) distinguish seven types of such strategies. However, their
de¯nition ofprivate protection is too narrow for the approach employed in this pa-
per. Private enforcement of property rights should also include such strategies as
relational contracting (assumed to be costly) and corruption of state administra-
tion. Of course, the agent may simply pay for the third-party enforcement (ma¯a,
say) 2. Frye and Zhuravskaya (1998) provide the results of survey of shopkeepers
in three Russian cities: 33 percent of respondents answered that enforcement of
agreements is a function of racket.
In the initial Tullock (1980) model of rent-seeking and in a great majority
of other papers devoted to directly unproductive activities, agents compare their
costs with their bene¯ts of participating in rent-seeking. In these models, agents
usually have a clear choice of whether or not to participate in appropriation (or
2Leitzel (1997) stresses that the main di®erence between 'ma¯a' private protection and pro-
tection provided by a Western-style security ¯rm is the di±culty of exit.
3perhaps mix productive and appropriative activities). For Russia, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that there can be no business without investment in private
protection of property rights (Alexeev, Gaddy, Leitzel, 1997; Leitzel, 1997; Frye
and Zhuravskaya, 1998). Then, as stressed in Shleifer (1995), the agents having
private protection have incentives to appropriate resources from others. Thus,
wide-spread private enforcement of property rights in transition economies is in-
herently stable.
There is substantial empirical and theoretical evidence that rent-seeking is
harmful for growth. It is worth to emphasize three essential types of negative
consequences of poor protection of property rights. First, the necessity to protect
wastes resources as protection/appropriation is an unproductive activity. Sec-
ond, the threat of appropriation distorts the economic environment and leads to
suboptimal paths of capital accumulation and production. Third, extensive rent-
seeking and improper public protection of property rights are usually associated
with substantial income and wealth inequality. The impacts of inequality and
redistribution policies on economic growth are studied in various growth theory
papers. In Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994), it is
shown, both theoretically and empirically, that inequality is harmful for growth.
However, in these papers, and also in Perotti (1993), mechanisms of redistribu-
tion are designed in favor of the poor, while for Russia it seems more plausible to
model redistribution of wealth in favor of the rich. Benabou (1996) extends these
models (particularly, the model of Persson and Tabellini, 1994) to explore the
impact of inequality on economic growth in detail. The theoretical model of the
present paper lays in the general framework of Verdier (1994) and Bourguignon
(1998) and follows the pattern of Benabou (1996).
Negative impact of poor protection of property rights on economic growth is
stressed in classical works such as North (1981). Classical sources on rent-seeking
are Krueger (1974) and Tullock (1980). Using axiomatic approach, income distri-
bution in a rent-seeking environment is studied in Hirshleifer (1991), Skaperdas
4(1992), and Skaperdas and Syropuolos (1997). In Grossman and Kim (1995),
agents allocate real resources between appropriative and productive activities in
a general equilibrium model. Although the game described in this paper is one-
shot, in the concluding section authors state that it would be interesting to extend
the model to a dynamic framework. In Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993), rent-
seeking activity exhibit increasing returns and thus is more attractive relative to
production. This leads to multiple equilibria, with "bad" equilibrium being stable
and exhibiting a low level of output. It should be noted that for su±ciently high
levels of rent-seeking, an increase in a number of rent-seekers reduces their income
as the "pie" of the same size is divided by an increased number of participants.
Also, there is a vast literature on interrelationship of law and ¯nance (e.g., vari-
ous papers of La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny) which stresses the
necessity of adequate investor and minority shareholder protection, etc.
Spontaneousemergenceofproperty rightsandappropriationactivity in economies
in transition were considered in Shleifer (1995) and in Polishchuk and Savvateev
(1997). An empirical evidence on uno±cial economy in transition (note that an
uno±cial economy relies exclusively on private contract enforcement) is presented
and extensively discussed in Johnson, Kaufman, and Shleifer (1998). The political
economy of partial reforms in transition economies with the emphasis on the role
of powerfull rent-seekers is studied in Hellman (1998).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a theoretical model
is presented and its implications are brie°y discussed. Section3 presents results of
an empirical investigation testing the theory implications, and discusses evidence
obtained from other sources. Section 4 concludes.
52. The Theory
2.1. Agents
There is a continuum [0;1] of heterogeneous overlapping-generations families.
Each member i born at the period t has the utility function
uit = lncit + ½lndit;
where cit is consumption when young, dit is consumption when old, and ½ is the
common discount factor. This agent i is born endowed with individual-speci¯c
basic level of skills wit: To simplify the subsequent analysis, I will assume that the
skills are distributed across agents log-normally:
lnwit » N(m;¾2);
and let wt denote the mean (and the aggregate) level of basic skills, wt = Ewit =
em+¾2
2 :3 Intergenerational linkages are as follows:
wit+1 = "it+1yit; (2.1)
where "it+1 is an i.i.d. shock with mean1 and V ar[ln"it+1] = ±2; yit is the second-
period income of the member offamily i (tobede¯ned later). Similar assumptions
are maintained in Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Benabou (1996). Herein time
indices are skipped as the analysis is focused on members of one generation.
Each agent i has an access to a Cobb-Douglas technology, so that the second-
period income is yi = Ae k
¯
i w1¡¯; where e ki is productive capital after redistribution,
A is an exogenously given technological parameter, and w is the economy-wide
endowment of basic skills. The e ki depends not only on the capital investment
ki of the agent i, but also on investment of the agent i into private protection
of property rights and both types of investment of the other agents (see below).
There are no credit markets, so agents have no possibility to borrow or lend to
3It is also assume that ¾2 >
½¯
1+½¯:
6optimize consumption intertemporarily. This idealistic assumption seems relevant
in a study of economies in transition (see Polishchuk, 1995).
2.2. Private Enforcement of Property Rights
In addition to investment in production (see below), each agent may invest in
protection of her property rights. If ki is the capital expenditures of the agent i,
and hi is the amount invested in protection, then after redistribution the agent's i
productive capital is e ki = kihµ












The parameter µ ¸ 0 measures thee®ectiveness ofappropriative technology. (This
technology is both o®ensive and defensive in the sense of Grossman and Kim,
1995.) The case µ = 0 then corresponds to full public protection of property
rights. In this case, hi = 0; g = 1; and no redistribution actually take place. If
µ > 0; then, given the redistribution technology, each agent invests some positive
amount of capital in appropriation/protection activity. Note that the balance
condition above shows that the appropriative investment is totally wasted. In
Tullock (1980) words, there is a negative sum game.









This might be interpreted as a special form of Tullock rent-seeking competition
(Tullock, 1980). Here contest inputs hi are weighted by the amount of capital
invested, and the whole capital invested in production forms the rent-seeking pie.
This type of redistribution possesses the basic features of Tullock competition:
the relative success is a function of the parties' respective resource commitments.
Precisely, the agent's proportionate share of the pie depends positively on her
contest input and negatively on contest inputs of the others. It should be noted
that here the value of the prize,
R1
0 kidi; is endogenous variable as productive and
7appropriative capital are rival uses of resources (see Hirshleifer, 1988 and Skaper-
das, 1995). Also, it is assumed, departing from the initial Tullock framework,




2.3. Inequality and Growth








This maximizationproblem presumes that there are nocapital markets. Although
suchan extreme assumptionis not unusual in transition literature, the case ofper-
fect capital markets will be brie°y discussed below (see Extensions). A standard








The intuition is straightforward: investment in productive capital rises with im-
provement of property rights protection (µ decreases) and productivity, ¯; that is
p0(µ) < 0 and p0(¯) > 0; while investment in appropriation and thus welfare losses
rise with µ; i.e. r0(µ) > 0. If property rights are fully secured, µ = 0; then hi = 0;
and each agent splits his endowment between consumption and production.
Note that those agents that lose in redistribution overconsume in the ¯rst
period, while those who gain underconsume compared to the case of µ = 0: That
is, beside the dead-weightlosses, rent-seeking distorts economic environment. The










Summing over all agents, one can get an expression for the growth rate of the
aggregate income:




8The intuitionis againstraightforward. Withlow level ofproperty rightsprotection
(high µ) agents divert more resources from production to private protection of
property rights (appropriation). This is in line with results of Murphy, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1993).
Proposition 1. Growth rate increases with the level of property rights protec-
tion by the state, and is maximized when property rights are fully secured, µ = 0:
The negative e®ect of poor protection of property rights comes from two
sources: First, the higher is µ; i.e. the lower is the level of property rights protec-
tion by the state, the more resources,
½¯µ
1+½¯(1+µ); is devoted to private protection, a
directly unproductive activity. Second, an increase in µ makes budget constraints
more binding; this e®ect is re°ected in the second term of equation (2.3): in
the absence of asset markets poor underinvest compared to the socially e±cient
level. Since here the rich are the main bene¯ciaries of redistributive activity in
the model, inequality (as represented by ¾) hampers productive investment and
thus growth given any level of property rights protection µ. If the capital mar-
ket is perfect with the interest rate equal to the marginal product of productive
capital, then the growth rate is °(µ) = lnA + ¯ lns(µ); and there is no second
e®ect of incomplete protection of property rights as all the agents will invest the
same amount of capital in production. Also, in this case inequality does not a®ect
the growth rate. It is of course hard to imagine perfect capital markets in the
absence of full protection of property rights. If we instead assume that loans and
debts are subject for appropriation in the way described above, the results will be
essentially the same.
In the current setting, the impact of inequality on growth is similar to those of
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), and Benabou (1996) , and di®ers from those of Galor
and Zeira (1993), Perotti (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993), or Aghion and
Bolton (1997), where e®ects of inequality and redistribution on growth depend
on the initial wealth or income distribution. In Persson and Tabellini (1994),
9the basic model yields similar results, but it is shown that the model may be
easily modi¯ed to incorporate in°uence of initial wealth distribution on inequality
e®ects. It should be noted that in all these models the poor are the bene¯ciaries
of redistribution. Redistribution toward relatively poor agents may occur through
progressive taxation of capital income, directsocial transfers, extensive regulation,
trade and capital restrictions, etc. (See Benabou, 1996 and Alesina and Rodrik,
1994.) Persson and Tabellini (1994) simply assume that incomplete protection of
property rights (through proportional tax on income) leads to redistribution of
wealth from rich agents to poor.
2.4. Political Economy
The next goal is to determine the level of property rights protection preferred by
an agent i: Given some level µ; agent's i utility is:













It is an easy exercise to prove that any agent i has single-peaked preferences over
µ ¸ 0: This assures that the agent's i problem has a unique solution, µ¤
i:
Proposition 2. Let w be such that lnw = 1+ m+¾2:
(i) Any agent i with wi · w prefers full protection of property rights, µ¤
i = 0:
(ii) Any agent i with wi > w prefers incomplete protection of property rights,
µ¤
i > 0:
(iii) If wi ¸ wj; then µ¤
i ¸ µ¤
j; that is, the richer the agent, the less secured
property rights she prefers.
In recent rent-seeking literature, the level of property rights protection is of-
ten endogenous (see, e.g., Grossman and Kim, 1995). However, the nature of
10rent-seeking models left little chances that these models may be modi¯ed for the
study of growth issues. Perotti (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and
Tabellini (1994), and Benabou (1996) have endogenized tax policy in the political
equilibrium of endogenous-growth models. In this subsection, my main goal is
to endogenize the level of property rights protection, as parametrized by µ; in an
analogous way. I will assume that the old generation does not participate in the
process.
The most straightforward approach is the use of the median-voter theorem of
Grandmont (1978). However, it is doubtful that transition economies satisfy this
"one person, one vote' ideal. Rather, anecdotal evidence suggests that in Russia
and other FSU countries the level of property rights protection is determined by
a relatively narrow group of powerful agents. Following Benabou (1996), let it be
the pivotal voter located at the pth percentile of the wealth (instead of usual 50th
percentile). Then her wealth wp is de¯ned by F((lnwp ¡ m)=¾)) = p; where F
is the c.d.f. of a standard normal. One can reformulate this as follows: lnwp =
m+ ¸¾; where ¸ = F ¡1(p): If ¸ > 0; that is p > 1
2; the political system is biased
toward rich. Historically, this case corresponds to wealth-restricted franchise, and
today the bias toward rich might be due to their high lobbying power, imperfect
political information, dependence on transfers from the central government in
a transition economy, etc. For a deeper discussion of a wealth bias of political
system, see Benabou (1996).
To investigate the e®ects of the wealth bias in the political system, substitute
lnwp = m + ¸¾ into u0
i(µ) = 0 for wp ¸ w (¸ ¸ ¾ + 1
¾) and note that µ¤ = 0 if
¸ · ¾ + 1
¾ :
Proposition 3. (i) The more democratic is the society (the lower is the degree
of wealth bias of the pivotal voter, ¸); the more secure are property rights in the
political equilibrium (the lower is µ¤). If ¸ ¸ ¾+ 1
¾; then µ¤ strictly increases with
¸:
(ii) The political equilibrium leads to full public protection of property rights,
11µ = 0; if and only if ¸ · ¾ +
1
¾:
(iii) An increase in inequality leads to a higher level of protection of property
rights by the state.
The last statement follows from the fact that increased inequality reduces
the appropriation gains of the rich, and thus makes incomplete protection less
attractive. This e®ect complicates investigation of the impact of inequality on
growth. While the direct e®ect of inequality on growth is negative, an increase
in inequality forces the pivotal voter (who, all other things being equal, becomes
poorer thanbefore) to call for more secure property rights and favor more growth.











@¾;where the ¯rst term
on the right-hand side represents the direct e®ect of inequality on growth(holding
policy, µ; ¯xed), and the second represents the indirect one. If property rights are
fully protected, then inequality a®ects growth exclusively through binding wealth
constraints.
2.5. Dynamics of Inequality and Multiple Equilibria
The formula 2.1 gives the intragenerational dynamics of income within a family.






where µt is the level of property rights protection chosen in period t: (Recall that
µt is chosen by agents born at the period t:) Assuming V ar[ln"it+1] = ±2; one can









Now a marginal worsening of property rights protection increases not only the
current inequality, but also inequality in all future periods.
Proposition 4. If there is a strong wealth bias in the political system, ¸ ¸
¾ + 1
¾; then there are multiple steady-states.
12The presence of multiple steady states may provide an explanation of consid-
erably di®erent transition paths of Poland and Russia (Frye and Shleifer, 1997).
When a political system has a signi¯cant wealth bias, it may be locked in a bad
long-run equilibrium, i.e. in an equilibrium with low level protection of pub-
lic protection of property rights and low growth rate. As Hellman (1998) notes
"the winners [of reforms] might have an implicit veto power in the decisions over
separate components of reforms, especially those that a®ect their existing rent
streams". Mathematically, a negative general equilibrium feedback of inequality
on the level of property rights protection worsens budget constraints, and this
e®ect allows to get multiple long-run steady states. The assumption of imperfect
capital markets are crucial for this result: if agents are free to lend to and borrow
from each other, their investment will always be socially optimal (given a level of
property rights protection).
Many growth-theoretic models generate an inverted-U relationship between
inequality and growth (e.g., Perotti (1993), Benabou (1996)). To allow for this
e®ect inthemodel, it isnecessary to introduce the 'inverse' redistribution from the
rich to the poor (e.g., through progressive taxation and social security programs).
E®ects of such redistribution on growth in the case of full protection of property
rights is studied in detail in Benabou (1996). In an economy with incomplete
protection of property rights the redistribution toward poor will reduce direct
e®ects of rent-seeking redistribution, but the qualitative results remain the same.
Moreover, the situation will worsen as the rent-seeking pie will increase and the
rich agents will have more incentives to invest in appropriation. This will also
make existence of multiple bad equilibria even more probable.
The model above allows to get some implications about foreign direct invest-
ment in transition economies. Brock (1997) found foreign direct investment in
Russia (and other FSU countries) to be much lower than in East European tran-
sition economies (not to say about developed countries). Similarly, FDI vary
signi¯cantly across Russian regions. Our analysis sheds some light on this phe-
13nomenon: ¯rst, investment in private protection is waste of resources for a foreign
investor; second, in terms of the model above, the overall investment should be
very large to allow for redistribution gains. The situation is even worse for a
foreign investor as agencies providing protection in the host country can discrim-
inate. Last but not least, such an investment may be considered illegal in the
domestic country of the investor.
2.6. Why Is Manna so Harmful for Growth?
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) and Shleifer (1995) emphasize that rent-
seeking may be self-generating. The situation is worse, the bigger is the rent-
seeking pie. For example, when a foreign (e.g., IMF or the World Bank) loan is
obtained, large rent-seekers may maintain their appropriative capacities to strug-
gle for the pie, and then use the o®ensive weapons to appropriate resources from
others. O®ense creates the demand for defense, and so on. Also, the argument
applies tomany privatization cases. Further, where rent-seeking is allowed (public
protection of property rights is poor), the natural rents (recall that the Gazprom
pays 25percent of taxes collectedby Russian government) constitutean attractive
pie.
Assume that, besides production and appropriation, an agent gains from rent-
seeking, where the rent-seeking pie is exogenous. The agent's i share of the pie
depends positively on her own investment in private protection (appropriation) ,
hi; and negatively on investment of the other agents. Speci¯cally, it is assumed





where ¢ is an exogenous rent-seeking pie, the multiplier g is de¯ned as above by











idi;the sum ofcontest inputs of all agents. (See Hirshleifer(1989)for
properties ofrent-seeking games of such type.) Again, the rent-seeking technology
14favors rich: this is captured by the multiplier wi: For the sake of simplicity, it
is assumed that ¯ = 1; and therefore inequality do not play any role in the














Solving the problem, one can obtain optimal investment in production and ap-















If the pie, ¢; is large enough, then theendowment, wi; splits betweenconsumption
in the ¯rst period and investment in appropriation. In what follows, it is assumed






; and thus all solutions are interior. First, we
observe that p0
¢(µ;¢) < 0 and r0
¢(µ;¢) > 0; i.e. the larger is the rent-seeking pie,
the smaller is investment into production and the larger is the investment into
private protection, which increase agent's proceeds from rent-seeking.
Proposition 5. The larger is the rent-seeking pie, ¢; the lower is the growth
rate ° = °(µ;¢) of production in the economy.
This result is very intuitive: the possibility to gain from appropriation of an
exogenous pie reduces incentives to produce. If ¢ is a one-time in-°ow to the
economy, the growth rate in production will be a®ected in the next period only.
The result of Proposition 5 holds also in a more general setup (e.g., for ¯;½ 6= 1):
3. Evidence
The theoretical model allows to formulate some empirical predictions: First, im-
proper protection of property rights by the state and wide-spread rent-seeking
has a signi¯cant negative impact on the economic growth of the economy. Sec-
ond, an increase in income inequality may have positive impact on growth. It
15should be assumed that the political system is wealth-biased (¸ is positive and
relatively large). Large rent-seeking pie should lead to a low level of property
rights protection by the state.
3.1. Growth in Cross-Section of Russian Regions
In this subsection, the analysis is focused on Russian regional data. Since there
are no reliable time-series data on many of our variables before 1994, the analysis
is restricted to cross-section. Ilook at data from across section of Russian regions,
each of which treated as a whole economy.
The following messages of the theoretical model should be veri¯ed:
| Improper public protection of property rights and wide-spread rent-seeking
has a signi¯cant negative impact on the economic growth of a region. The hy-
pothesis is that the larger the number of agents with relatively small endowments
(such as small newly registered enterprises) and thus relatively small appropria-
tion power, the higher the growth rate.
| Income inequality have positive impact on growth. Theoretically, it should
be assumed that the political system is wealth-biased (¸ is positive and relatively
large).
| A priori, regional government's e®orts to establish duly protected prop-
erty rights and, more generally, to create a competitive environment should have
positive impact on growth. Since increased control of regional administration
over capital assets reduces the level of 'federal-level rent-seeking' in the region, it
should lead to higher level of public protection.
| Large rent-seeking pie (as proxied by, e.g., the share of expenditures on
governance in a region's budget) leads to a low level of property rights protection
by the state.
It is usually a challenging task to ¯nd a good proxy for the level of rent-seeking
(or the level of property rights protection). There are various indirect measures
of rent-seeking based on government budgetary allocations. (Such a measure
16may take into account pensions, social expenditures, tax privileges, etc.) For
Russia, the "degree of expenditure centralization" and the level of region-speci¯c
taxation may serve as measures of rent-seeking activity. Capture of rents may
be also re°ected in data on regional-government control of its capital (buildings,
equipment, machinery, etc.), including ownership claims to enterprise assets that
are dispersed over several regions. For theft and racketeering (small-scale rent-
seeking), the number of newly registered privately owned small enterprises might
be used as a proxy of the level of public protection of property rights in a region.
Laband and Sophocleus (1988), while measuring the social cost of rent-seeking
using cross-sectional dataon US states, employed thenumber oflegal andbusiness
services establishments per capita in each state in a base year as proxies for the
level of rent-seeking. Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) found that the formation of
new enterprises has a signi¯cant positive impact on growth of Russian regions
(see below). The model ultimately predicts the positive impact such enterprises
have on the region's growth rate. It is likely that these new, small enterprises
correspond to the agents in our model that have ¸ · 0 and so demand the
optimal level of property rights protection.
In the empirical study, the risk ranking given to all Russian regions by the
Bank of Austria using 1995 and earlier data was used as a proxy for the level of
property rights protection. If property rights protection is de¯ned as above, then
there is a direct link between the protection and risk.
Di®erent variables re°ecting regional-government initiatives in the ¯elds of
privatization, price liberalization, and industry subsidization were employed. The
idea is that the major source of di®erences in economic performance of Russian
regions might be considerable di®erence of economic policies of regional gov-
ernments, which have had substantial discretion over the implementation of re-
forms on the regional level. Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) found that regional-
government privatization initiatives have had a signi¯cant positive impact on es-
tablishment of new legal enterprises, and thus promoted growth. In my empirical
17exercise (see results and discussion below) I found no clear evidence in support of
this view.
Since, as it is stated in Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) 'public rent-
seeking is likely to hurt innovative activities more than everyday production', it
was a priori plausible to focus on regional private investment and consider it as
a dependent variable. The theoretical model predicts that improper protection of
property rights has a negative impact on investment. However, it was found that
the entire set of our explanatory variables have a very limited explanatory power
for our investment variable (using the average annual rate of change of investment
in Russian regions in 1996-1997).
It is necessary to control for the in°uence of other possible determinants of
growth of regions. The list of explanatory variables includes those re°ecting in-
dustrial structure (e.g., the share of exportables or value-added of tradable-goods
sectors in world prices at some base year), share of the military sector, and initial
conditions (e.g., living costs in 1994). The ¯rst group accounts for regional eco-
nomic di®erences resulting from the adjustment of di®erent sectors to a partial
opening of the Russian economy started in 1994. For military sector, we use the
employment in the defense industry. This measure may also serve as a proxy for
overall quality of labor force as employees of military sector are usually consid-
ered as more skilled than those employed in other sectors. Although the Russian
government demand for military hardware declined sharply, it is shown in Gaddy
(1996) that employment in the defense sector remained relatively stable during
the transition.
The baseline models and estimation results are as follows. In both cases, I
used similar speci¯cations and report OLS results. Both pairs of regression were
checked for potential simultaneity between Growth and NewEnt and Growth and
Risk, respectively: the ¯rst estimations were 2SLS, the ¯tted values substituted
into Growth regressions, and then the Hausman speci¯cation test (Green, 1997)
was used to test the equivalence. The test statistics showed that there is no
18evidence of simultaneity between Growth and NewEnt and Growth and Risk.
This equivalence allowed to consider the OLS results only.
Indoing this, data on 47 Russian regions in which the capital city comprises at
least thirty percent of the total population (including Moscow and St.Petersburg)
are employed. This restriction is due to two reasons: ¯rst, some data which
are important for our investigation were collected at the capital-city level; second,
anecdotal evidence suggests that such regions demonstrate tighter interconnection
between policies and their outcomes. The control variables Defense, Moscow,
Control, and North (i) are weakly correlated amongst themselves; (ii) have higher
degree of correlation with NewEnt and Risk, than with Growth, and thus were
used in the NewEnt and Risk regressions.
Data
The variables are de¯ned as follows:
Growth average annual growth rate of real per capita income, 1994-1997
NewEnt number of legally registered small privately owned enterprises, 1996
Privat index measuring the speed of regionally initiated small-scale
privatization, 1996
Share share of privatized small-scale enterprises, 1994
Control index of regional-government control of its capital, 1995
Price index measuring the extent of price liberalization, 1995
Govern share of regional government's expenditures on governance, 1994
Subsidy share of direct subsidies to enterprises in region's expenditures, 1995
Inequality ratio of 5th and 1th quantiles, 1994
Initial ratio of per capita money income to the cost of 19-bundle, 1993
IO value-added of tradable-goods sector in 1985 per employed worker
19Defense number of workers employed in the military sector per thousand of
employed workers, 1985
Municipal the share of privatization initiated by the local government, 1994-95
Resources an index of resource potential
Moscow dummy for Moscow city
North dummy for Northern territories (and territories with equal status)
PolitInst index of political stability compiled by MFK Renaissance, 1995-96
Risk risk rating compiled by the Bank of Austria, 1995-96
Sources: Goskomstat-RSY (1994-98): Growth, NewEnt, Inequality, Defense,
Municipal, Share, Govern, Subsidy; TACIS (1995): Privat, Price, Control, Re-
sources; Berkowitz and DeJong (1999): IO, Initial; MFK Renaissance: PolitInst;
Bank of Austria: Risk.
Growth Regressions
The Growth regression is as follows:
Growth= ¯0 + ¯1Level-of-Protection+¯2IO+¯3Resources+¯4PolitInst+u:
There are two di®erent proxies for the level of public protection: NewEnt and
Risk. Correlation between the these two proxies is -0,82. Below the results of two
OLS growth regressions are reported and brie°y discussed. Sensitivity Analysis
for the whole exercise is provided below.
Dependent variable: Growth
R2 = 0:439156; F(4;42) = 8:2218[0:0001]
Variable Coe±cient Std.Error t-value t-prob
Constant 3.1777 4.4982 0.706 0.484
IO 0.1332 0.0458 2.906 0.006
PolitInst -0.1730 0.0616 -2.811 0.008
Resources -17.838 37.180 -0.480 0.634
NewEnt 1.4356 0.2796 5.136 0.000
20Dependent variable: Growth
R2 = 0:556725; F(4;42) = 13:187[0:0000]
Variable Coe±cient Std.Error t-value t-prob
Constant 26.9220 5.8023 4.812 0.000
IO 0.0817 0.0406 2.013 0.050
PolitInst -0.1881 0.0545 -3.452 0.001
Resources -30.499 33.270 -0.917 0.3645
Risk -3.6359 0.5449 -6.672 0.000
Theestimationresults reportedaboveare quite encouraging. BoththeNewEnt
and Risk variables (proxies for the level of public protection of property rights)
are very (see Sensitivity Analysis below) signi¯cant (at 1 percent level) and has
the predicted sign: the higher is the level of property rights protection by the
state (lower the risk), the higher is the growth rate of real income per capita.
The IO variable re°ecting pre-transition industrial structure (higher IO means
higher value-added of tradable-goods sector) and the index PolitInst for political
instability (compiled by MFK Renaissance using 1995-96 data) are also signi¯cant
at 1 percent level and have the expected signs. Political instability is bad for
growth, while good initial position in terms of productive capacities leads to a
higher growth rate (in the model the growth rate increases with A).
NewEnt and Risk Regressions
To test the model's predictions on impact of inequality and rent-seeking on the
level of public protection of property rights, I estimated both proxies for the
level of protection using variables for inequality (Inequality, ratio of 5th and 1th




21R2 = 0:681342; F(6;40) = 14:254[0:0000]
Variable Coe±cient Std.Error t-value t-prob
Constant 0.7593 0.9199 0.825 0.414
Defense 3.4782 2.0213 1.721 0.093
Moscow 11.527 1.6800 6.861 0.000
Control 2.6300 1.2175 2.160 0.036
Inequality 0.1067 0.0293 3.636 0.000
North 1.9308 0.6223 3.103 0.003
Govern -0.7702 0.2616 -2.944 0.005
Dependent variable: Risk
R2 = 0:499679, F(6;40) = 6:6581[0:0001]
Variable Coe±cient Std.Error t-value t-prob
Constant 5.4490 0.5280 10.320 0.000
Defense -2.0778 1.1602 -1.791 0.080
Moscow -4.3077 0.96431 -4.467 0.000
Control 0.3075 0.6988 0.440 0.662
Inequality -0.0420 0.15019 -2.499 0.016
North -0.6341 0.357 -1.775 0.083
Govern 0.3663 0.1501 2.440 0.019
The results are again supportivefor the theory. All the variables are signi¯cant
at 10 percent level and have the expected signs. (Note that Risk and NewEnt
have 'di®erent signs': higher level of protection provided by the state is re°ected
by higher NewEnt and lower Risk. Thus, the coe±cients in the two equations
should have opposite signs.) Inequality is signi¯cant at 5 percent level in the
NewEnt regression and at 1 percent level in the Risk regression. The coe±cients
show that an increase in the ratio of 5th and 1th quantiles improves public pro-
tection of property rights as it was predicted by the theory. One might infer that
this ¯nding provide some support for the assumption that the policy in Russian
regions is determined by a relatively small group of rich agents (¸ is large). The
22rent-seeking proxy, Govern, is signi¯cant at 5 percent level in the NewEnt regres-
sion and at 1 percent level in the Risk regression. This also strongly supports
the model's implications. The Moscow dummy is signi¯cant at 1 percent level in
both regressions. However, it is more important that the inclusion of a dummy
for Moscow have not altered the qualitative results. The Control variable is sig-
ni¯cant at 5 percent level in the NewEnt regression and is insigni¯cant in the
Risk regression (and has the wrong sign). The variable re°ecting initial position
in terms of human capital (Defense) has the predicted sign and is signi¯cant at
10 percent level in both regressions.
Why There Were No Policy Variables?
The list of variables above includes some variables re°ecting di®erences in reform
policies implemented at the regional level: privatization (Privat, Share, Munici-
pal), price liberalization (Price), and subsidies for enterprises (subsidy). However,
I found no possibility to obtain signi¯cant impact of any of these variables either
on growth in 1994-97 or on level of property rights protection (basically, in speci-
¯cations described above). One possible explanation is that these policy variables
are endogenous to initial conditions (including inequality). It should be empha-
sized that Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) found a signi¯cant impact of reforms on
growth of Russian regions. (The model speci¯cation was di®erent.) For transition
economies, there is a vast literature in support of the view that privatization and
liberalization policies have very little e®ect on growth, while initial conditions and
e±ciency of institutions matter. (See, e.g., Popov, 1998).
To take into account possible in°uence of geographical positions, dummies for
geographic territories, and a dummy for the regions taking control of more than
1 (5, alternatively) percent of known Russia's natural resources were employed.
None of these dummies (with exception for the Moscow dummy and the dummy
for Northern territories) were signi¯cant in either of regressions, and their use did
23not alter the qualitative results of estimation. The statistical results obtained are
robust with respect to modi¯cations of the measures ofgrowth and new enterprise
formation. Speci¯cally, the growth in per capita food purchasing power of money
income (1993-1996) as an alternative measure of regions's growth (data on both
measures were reported by Goskomstat) was used. For the development of new
enterprises the total number of registered enterprises per thousand inhabitants
were employed. These new regressions lead to results similar to those reported
above; in particular, coe±cientsfor NewEnt, IO, PolitInst inthe growth regression
and Inequality and Govern remained signi¯cant and having the expected sign.
Also, we studiedrobustness excluding theinsigni¯cant variables from the analysis.
The only change is that Defense becomes insigni¯cant at 10% level.
To determine the validity of exclusionof Defense, Moscow, Control, Inequality,
North, and Govern from the growth regression, I regressed Growth on the entire
set of explanatory variables (separately for Risk and NewEnt) and then estimated
the restricted equation by OLS. I obtained F statistic of 0.66 with P-value of
0.19. Then I conducted a usual exclusion-restriction test (see Greene, 1997) for
each explanatory variable that does not enter the baseline growth regression. The
smallest P-value obtained is 0.23. Also, there was found no evidence against
exclusion of Growth from the NewEnt and Risk equations.
3.2. Other Evidence
The implications of the theoretical model are quite general and may be applied
not only to economies in transition, but to development of poor countries and his-
torical examples as well. For economies in transition, some recent papers provide
support to the main general messages of the model: ¯rst, institutional environ-
ment is a key ingredient of economic recovery; second, political economy is very
important. References include Johnson, Kaufman, and Shleifer (1998), Leitzel
(1997), Popov (1998), Berglof and van Thadden (1999), and many others. Be-
24low two papers which directly study Russian institutional environment are brie°y
discussed.
Recently, Frye and Shleifer (1997) conducted a survey of 105 small shops
in Moscow (55) and Warsaw (50) to compare the e®ectiveness of the Russian
and Polish legal systems in dispute resolution and the role of possible protec-
tion providers. Their study showed that in Russia, private protection of property
rights is wide-spread, there is much more need in public protection, and also that
enterprises have to operate in much more corrupt environment. Also, Frye and
Zhuravskaya (1998) conducted a survey of shopkeepers in three cities in Russia
and found that higher level of municipal-level regulation and lower levels of public
good provision are associated with higher probability of work under private pro-
tection. All of these three cities (Moscow, Smolensk, Ulyanovsk) enter our data
set (Growth=0.54, 0.04, -0.05, resp.) and are large cities located in the European
part of Russia. For illustrative purposes, the reader is provided with some results
of the survey (for the full detail, see Frye and Zhuravskaya, 1998):
Moscow Smolensk Ulyanovsk
Number of permits required to open 6.23 5.29 8.77
Number of inspections [regulation] 16.34 16.22 21.96
Contact with racket ever, % 86.0 51.9 56.7
Rate your biggest problems, 1-10
Taxes 8.57 8.00 8.38
Capital Shortage 6.57 6.67 6.97
Rental rates 7.88 5.58 6.02
Corruption 4.83 5.42 6.25
The results of this 'case study' are consistent with main messages of the em-
pirical results of this paper: deregulation and proper public protection of property
rights have positive impact on economic performance of a region. One surprising
fact is that the survey shows that taxes are considered as the main problem by
25a great majority of shopkeepers. Berkowitz and DeJong (1999), while explain-
ing the insigni¯cance of the tax variable in their growth regression, suggest that
"much of the burden is in the form of unreported payments demanded by cash
strapped or corrupt o±cials". However, it seems that the survey of Frye and
Zhuravskaya (1998) have made an explicit distinction between the tax payments
and the unreported payments for the respondents. So, it remains a puzzle.
4. Conclusion
Currently, the problem of e®ective enforcement and regulation of property rights
is of crucial importance for Russia and other economies in transition. The results
of the theoretical analysis and the existing empirical evidence clarify the mecha-
nism underlying the negative in°uence of poor protection of property rights and
the reverse e®ect of inequality on the economic performance of Russian regions.
Agents with no political power to appropriate privately the fruits of their e®orts
must devotesubstantial resources tothe protection of theirproductivecapital, and
this reduces the attractiveness of production. In other words, the contestability of
property rights diminishes incentives to invest and accumulate capital. Income in-
equality, which has substantially increased during transition, has a signi¯cant and
positive impact on the level of property rights protection. This suggests that the
level of property rights protectionis determined(inthe framework ofthe analysis)
by a narrow group of agents. In theory, it can be easily seen that improvements
in the ¯eld of property rights protection (both in the level and the e®ectiveness),
and a reduction in the level of rent-seeking activity, which in turn should reduce
inequality, are unavoidable preconditions for economic growth. Such improve-
ments may occur only if they are in the self-interest of the majority of population
or at least of the majority of those who determine the policy. In this respect,
further democratization should lead to more public protection of property rights,
and thus increase growth.
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29Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
The growth rate of the aggregate income is given by °(µ) = ln(y=w) = lnA+
¯lns¡ ¯(1¡ ¯)(1 +µ)2¾2
2 :
Ifthelevel ofpropertyrights protection increases(i.e. µ becomessmaller), then
s(µ) =
½¯
1+½¯(1+µ); the share of capital devoted to production, increases, and the
term ¯(1¡¯)(1+µ)2¾2
2 that represents losses due to redistribution and ine±cient
resource allocation, decreases. Thus, the growth rate °(µ) decreases with µ. If
µ = 0; there is no redistribution, and the growth rate is maximized, °(0) =
lnA+ ¯ln
½¯
1+½¯ ¡ ¯(1¡ ¯)¾2
2 :
Inequality enters the last term of the growth rate expression only. If ¾
02
is larger, than the losses increase, since budget constraints (in the absence of
complete ¯nancial markets) of agents become more binding. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2.
First, we shall prove that the function









is single-peaked for each i. For the maximization problem maxµ¸0ui(µ); the ¯rst-
order condition is
1+½¯
1+½¯(1+µ)+¾2(1+µ) = lnwi¡m: Denote Ã(µ) =
1+½¯
1+½¯(1+µ)+¾2(1+
µ); the left-hand side. Note that Ã(0) = 1 + ¾2 > 0: Taking the derivative, one
gets Ã0(µ) = ¾2¡
(1+½¯)½¯
(1+½¯(1+µ))2: Clearly, Ã00(µ) > 0 when µ ¸ 0, and by assumption
(see footnote 3 on page 5) Ã0(0) = ¾2¡
½¯
1+½¯ > 0. This implies that Ã0(µ) > 0 for
all µ ¸ 0; whence Ã(µ) is an increasing function of µ ¸ 0: Therefore, the ¯rst-order
condition Ã(µ) = lnwi¡m has at most one root µ ¸ 0; and u0
i(µ) > 0; if 0 · µ < µ
and u0
i(µ) < 0; if µ < µ: If there are no non-negative roots, i.e Ã(0) ¸ lnwi ¡ m;
then u0
i(µ) < 0 for all µ ¸ 0; and therefore, µ¤
i = 0:
Now let w be such that lnw = lnw + 1 + ¾2
2 ; where w = Ewi = em+
¾2
2 :
(i) If wi · w = e1+m+¾2; then Ã(0) = 1+ ¾2 ¸ lnwi ¡ m: Since Ã0(µ) > 0 for
all µ ¸ 0; µ¤
i = 0 as shown in the Proof of Lemma 1.
30(ii) If wi > w; then the equation Ã(µ) = lnwi ¡ m has a positive root, µ¤
i:
(iii) The possibility to have µ¤
i = µ¤
j; when wi 6= wj arises when wi · w as
shown in (i). To show that if wi > w; then µ¤
i strictly increases with wi, suppose
that wi < wj; and note that µ¤
i and µ¤
j are roots of equations Ã(µ) = lnwi¡m and
Ã(µ) = lnwj ¡m; respectively. Then Ã(µ¤
i) < Ã(µ¤
j); since Ã is strictly increasing
in µ; and µ¤
i < µ¤
j follows.¥
Proof of Proposition 3.
The level of property rights protection by thestate is determinedby the pivotal
agent pwithwp suchthat lnwp = m+¸¾: Thus, the equilibrium level ofprotection,
µ¤ = µ¤
p; satis¯es Ã(µ¤) = lnwp ¡ m = ¸¾:
(i) Since Ã is strictly increasing in µ; the lower is ¸; the wealth bias, the lower is
µ¤; the equilibrium level of protection. (Lower µ¤ corresponds to more protection.)
(ii) Using (i) and Proposition 2.(i) and (iii), one gets that if ¸¾ > 1+¾2; then
µ¤ > 0: On the other hand, if ¸¾ · 1+¾2; then µ¤ = 0: Therefore, an agent with
¸ = ¾ + 1
¾ is the wealthiest agent voting for full public protection of property
rights.
(iii) If µ¤ = 0; there is nothing to prove. Thus, it is assumed that µ¤ > 0: I
analyze the ¯rst-order conditionfor the level-of-protection maximization problem,
maxµ¸0up(µ) :
1+½¯
1+½¯(1+µ¤) = ¸¾ ¡¾2(1+µ¤): Note that the left-hand side does not
depend on ¾: If ¾2 ¸
1
2; then the right-hand side shifts down and becomes steeper
when ¾ increases. Thus, µ¤ depends negatively on ¾:
Now suppose that ¾2 < 1
2; i.e. ¾ < 1
4: Consider some ¾ < ¾0; both less than
1
4; and let µ¤ = µ¤(¾) and µ¤0 = µ¤(¾0); respectively. First, we observe that if
µ¤ ¸ ¸
¾+¾0 ¡ 1; then µ¤0 < µ¤: Indeed, multiplying by (¾02 ¡ ¾2); one can rewrite





1+½¯(1+µ¤) +¾02µ¤ ¸ ¸¾0 ¡¾02(1+µ¤): Therefore, the
line f(µ) = ¸¾0¡¾02(1+µ) lies below the line f(µ) =
1+½¯
1+½¯(1+µ¤)+¾02µ¤¡¾02µ (note
that both lines have the same slope). Since
1+½¯
1+½¯(1+µ) decreases with µ; µ¤0 < µ¤:
It remains to prove that µ¤ = µ¤(¾) ¸
¸
¾+¾0 ¡ 1: It is su±cient to show that
31µ¤ ¸
¸
2¾¡1: From the ¯rst-order condition, one gets ¸¾ < 1+¾2(1+µ¤): It follows
that 1+µ¤ >
¸¡1
¾ : Since ¾ <
1









latter inequality follows from ¸ ¸ ¾ + 1
¾): Therefore, we proved that µ¤ ¸ ¸
2¾ ¡ 1
as claimed. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4.




¾2 = ±2 + ¯2(1+ µ¤)2¾2;
1+½¯
1+½¯(1+µ¤) = ¸¾ ¡ ¾2(1+ µ¤):
Solving the ¯rst equation for (1+ µ¤) =
p
¾2¡±2
¯¾ ; we substitute the result into the










¾2¡ ±2;an equation in one variable.









¾2 ¡ ±2 = ¸¾: It is straightforward to show
that the left-hand side is an increasing concave function. Then there exists some
¸ such that for any ¸ ¸ ¸; there are at least two steady-states.¥
Proof of Proposition 5.
The ¯rst-order conditions areas follows: 1
wi¡ki¡hi = A
Aki+¢wi=H and hi = µ(wi¡















where the balance condition gives gH = eµ¾2
: Then the growth rate is given by










Clearly, the growth rate ° decreases with ¢; and ° is maximized when ¢ = 0:¥
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